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I. Introduction
There is certainly a place for regionalism in Northeast Asia.1 It already exists in 
various amorphous ways, but regional identity is relatively weak in Northeast 
Asia, and for this and other reasons little structure has emerged to channel dip-
lomatic or economic activity in the area. In Northeast Asia there is no regional 
trade pact like the North American Free Trade Agreement, no forum for dip-
lomatic and economic dialogue or policy coordination such as the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), no movement for regional unity like the 
League of Arab States or the African Union, nor any other broad-based forum 
or organization such as the South American Regional Union, the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union (EU), or the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This is true despite the fact that Northeast 
Asia is one of the world’s most economically vibrant regions with high levels 
of intraregional trade. It also stands at the forefront of global efforts to combat 
nuclear and missile proliferation and other forms of illicit trade. Such circum-
stances have led nations in other parts of the world to join with neighbors to 
create rules, norms, and institutions for promoting mutual benefi t or guarding 
against dangerous threats. Why have they not done so in Northeast Asia, and 
what does this suggest for the region’s future?
One can offer a variety of theories to explain why Northeast Asia is “under-
institutionalized,” the two most basic of which are that such a move is either (a) 
unnecessary or (b) too diffi cult. It could be unnecessary because global, broader 
regional, and smaller multilateral (even bilateral) institutions and agreements 
are usually suffi cient to address Northeast Asia’s needs, whether it is the United 
Nations, the World Trade Organization, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), or 
the bilateral security alliances of the United States with Japan and South Korea 
(Republic of Korea or ROK).2 The region has been relatively stable and prosper-
ous for decades, and, although it faces some intractable security and territorial 
disputes, they have not hampered regional growth overall. It is highly doubtful 
anyway that a Northeast Asia–specifi c solution can somehow address these is-
sues more effectively than other possible approaches (for example, bilateral or 
through international arbitration).
1 In this paper, “regionalism” refers to the formation of interstate norms, rules, associations, or insti-
tutions based on geographic regions and aimed at addressing issues of common concern within the 
region for mutual benefi t, or at strengthening the region’s voice in wider regional or global organiza-
tions.
2 In this case, the region could be said to be subordinated to the trends in wider regional or global 
systems (Yamamoto 2008, 27).
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It is true that historical animosities and distrust run deep through many of these 
nations, and trend analysis of public opinion polls during the past few decades 
shows how tenuous and event-dependent warmer intraregional relations have 
been.3 Simmering disputes over islands, borders, ocean rights, history text-
books, and other issues quickly overwhelm regional cooperation initiatives and 
make them politically expensive when disputes rise to the surface. Moreover, 
these disputes involve all of the major players in Northeast Asia in different 
combinations, including the ROK-Japan territorial disagreement about Dokdo/
Takeshima, the Japan-China argument about Senkaku/Daiyoutai islands, or the 
Koguryo controversy involving China and South Korea. In this sense, meaningful 
institution building in Northeast Asia might simply be too hard to accomplish. 
Nationalism supersedes regionalism, and there is no lingua franca that helps to 
bind the region together.4
An unsatisfying (but probably accurate) answer to the question above is that 
the lack of robust Northeast Asian regionalism is the result of both (a) and (b). 
Regional institutions are often not necessary to maintain stability and prosper-
ity, and when they might be considered marginally useful, the barriers to their 
creation are formidable and largely prohibitive. In many respects, the fault line 
along which cooperation and division coexist is Korea’s Demilitarized Zone 
and the ROK–North Korea border (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or 
DPRK). Cooperation has been necessary to address certain problems related to 
the North, but the divided peninsula is also a major reason why the region has 
trouble moving beyond the Pacifi c War, the Korean War, and the Cold War. On 
almost every security, economic, or political issue, a comprehensive regional 
response is practically impossible without North Korea’s involvement, and it 
does not seem feasible with North Korea, either.
The future of Northeast Asian regionalism must acknowledge this paradox and 
make minor advances despite its retarding effects. The best way to do this is 
to take advantage of existing mechanisms (bilateral, minilateral, regional, and 
global) and use them to promote standardization and dispute resolution within 
Northeast Asia, as well as to consolidate and strengthen Northeast Asia’s voice 
in regional and global institutions. Two regional constructs are critical to mak-
ing this work: the budding trilateralism among China, Japan, and South Korea, 
and the six-party talks (with or without North Korea’s active participation). 
Together they can build around (and upon) the U.S. bilateral alliances with 
3 For a Japan-specifi c example based on Japan’s Cabinet Offi ce public opinion surveys, see Schoff 
(2009, 42–43).
4 English or another language in common is not used for business and government communication 
in Northeast Asia to the same extent that it is in Southeast Asia. As an example, the ASEAN charter 
of 2007 exists in one offi cial and original language, English.
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South Korea and Japan. With the right leadership and suffi cient commitment 
from the countries involved, the Northeast Asian region can build a more solid 
foundation for its future prosperity and stability. The nascent regionalism evident 
in Northeast Asia could be a useful tool in the future for mitigating potential 
negative effects of changes in the regional balance of power and any growing 
rivalry and competition.
II. Understanding Regionalism in Northeast Asia
Before we can discuss regionalism in Northeast Asia, it is important to describe 
how we defi ne the region in specifi c terms. This is actually diffi cult to do with-
out stimulating an argument about which countries should (or should not) be 
included. Part of the problem stems from the fact that two countries clearly 
within the region (Russia and China) are among the largest in the world and 
are physically present in other global regions (and participate in other regional 
institutions). Only three countries (Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) exist 
solely within Northeast Asia. Moreover, because of its formal security and politi-
cal agreements, forward-deployed forces, and strong trade and investment ties, 
the United States is considered by most to be an integral part of the region, even 
if a map suggests otherwise. The divided Korean peninsula and the enduring 
sovereignty dispute between China and Taiwan only compound the challenge 
of defi ning the region, and Northeast Asia’s early experiments with institution 
building have not clarifi ed the issue.
One way to defi ne Northeast Asia geographically is to include those countries 
bordering the East Sea/Sea of Japan or the East China Sea, namely China, Ja-
pan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and Taiwan. Most organizations tend to 
exclude Taiwan, however, although they often include Mongolia. The Northeast 
Asia Economic Forum, for example, includes Mongolia and the United States, 
while the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia also includes Mon-
golia (but not the United States). These associations are open to North Korean 
participation, but Pyongyang’s attendance and contributions are sporadic and 
largely inconsequential. The Northeast Asian Gas and Pipeline Forum involves 
only China, Russia, Mongolia, Japan, and South Korea. The North Pacifi c 
Coast Guard Forum does not include North Korea or Mongolia, but Canada 
participates. It is interesting that the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) in the 
United States has a Northeast Asia Council that does not include China (which 
has a separate council with “inner Asia”), and the AAS apparently does not 
consider Russian studies to be a part of its Asian portfolio. Beijing puts Russia 
in the Europe category for its trade and related record keeping. These are all 
anecdotal examples drawn from a small pool of attempts at building regionally 
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focused  organizations, but they illustrate the fl uidity of a regional construct from 
a geographical perspective, depending on the topic and the politics.
Another way to look at the region is from a trade and economic perspective, 
focused on transactions. In this regard, the scale and interconnectedness of 
economic activity are remarkable, particularly among the core Northeast Asian 
states of China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as with the United States. The 
United States, Japan, and China are the three largest economies in the world, 
and they are all among each other’s largest trading partners (Table 1).5 Together 
they account for more than 38 percent of world GDP, and adding Russia and 
South Korea raises that share to almost 43 percent. China, Japan, and Korea are 
all among each other’s top three trading partners. This is de facto regionalism, 
even if it is not institutionalized.
Table 1: Top Trading Partners of Selected Countries, 2008
Sources: World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 28 August 2009; Federal Customs Service of 
the Russian Federation.
1 The ranking for Russia is based on offi cially released trade fi gures for the period January–June 
2009.
Note: Hong Kong is not included in this calculation. If it were included, it would replace the Republic 
of Korea as China’s third-largest trading partner.
Northeast Asia’s dynamic growth, together with growth in Southeast Asia and 
with the end of the Cold War, explains how Asia began to emerge as a distinct 
core world region in the late 1980s, and how it managed to move from being a 
“subordinate to a regional dominant security system” (Alagappa 2008, 39–43). 
As Alagappa (2008, 46) explains, “regional actors and their interests now drive 
confl ict formation and resolution in Asia. Extraregional actors are involved . . . but 
their salience derives from their interaction with Asian state and nonstate actors 
on issues of mutual concern.” This transition from a subordinate to a regional 
dominant system might not be complete (especially when it comes to institu-
tionalization), but it appears to be moving in that direction, and it is part of the 
5 They are the three largest economies by GDP as ranked in 2008 by the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank.
Country
No. 1 trading 
partner
No. 2 trading 
partner
No. 3 trading 
partner
China United States Japan Republic of Korea
Japan China United States Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea China Japan United States
Russia Germany China Netherlands
United States Canada China Mexico
156 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
impetus behind the ROK, China, and Japan’s recent conversation about building 
a so-called East Asian community (Kobayashi and Murao 2009).
Evidence of this transition was already visible a decade ago in the aftermath of 
the Asian fi nancial crisis of 1997 (what many in Asia still refer to as the “IMF 
crisis”). The fi rst ASEAN Plus Three summit (that is, ASEAN plus the ROK, 
China, and Japan) held later in 1997 was a direct result of the fi nancial melt-
down, and it led to the establishment of a network of bilateral swap arrangements 
known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which is an all-Asian countermeasure 
anchored by Northeast Asia. Alagappa’s characterization of a regional dominant 
system also fi ts with China’s emergence as chair of the six-party talks aimed 
at peaceful North Korean denuclearization and regional security and economic 
cooperation.6 In this context of Northeast Asian dynamism, the Untied States 
has slowly become an extraregional actor, albeit a preeminent one and one 
that will remain intimately involved in regional institutions for some time.
We can also consider Russia to be an extraregional actor in Northeast Asia, pri-
marily because of its lack of economic and security policy impact on the region, 
despite its geographic proximity. Russia’s center of historical and economic grav-
ity is located in its European part, in the same way that China’s center of gravity 
is more East Asian than it is Central or South Asian. Past Soviet calls for a “col-
lective security system in Asia” date back to Leonid Brezhnev in 1969 (echoed 
later by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 and 1988), but more often they seemed like 
pleas for relevance in the region instead of proposals that commanded respect 
and serious consideration by its neighbors (Gordon 1990, 47). Russia, owing to 
its fossil fuel wealth, has become more relevant since the early years following 
the Cold War, but it is still just a minor trade player in the region. Because of 
insuffi cient export infrastructure, less than 5 percent of Russia’s oil and natural 
gas exports go to Northeast Asia, and Russian travel to Japan and South Korea 
is insignifi cant compared with other nations in the region (DOE 2008).
All of this might change gradually as new energy pipelines are built and if the 
Russian Far East can develop economically, but for now it seems most appropri-
ate to consider China, Japan, and South Korea as the center of Northeast Asian 
regionalism, with the United States, Russia, and Mongolia on the periphery.7 
6 The six-party talks comprise China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United 
States.
7 This is not to suggest that the potential role and infl uence of all these peripheral nations are similar. 
As mentioned above, the United States will be the preeminent extraregional actor in Northeast Asia, 
probably for decades to come. Russia’s potential role is much larger than that of Mongolia, and Rus-
sia is poised to increase its infl uence if it can strengthen the energy and economic infrastructure in 
its eastern regions.
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North Korea has essentially removed itself from the region through its own 
economic management, pursuit of nuclear weapons, and other policies although 
it controls its own fate and could re-enter the regional mix if it adopted a new 
approach. In contrast, Taiwan now relies heavily on Beijing to determine how 
deeply the island nation can become involved in regional initiatives, but it 
would be wrong to dismiss Taiwan. It is still an important economic player in 
the region, and fi nding ways to include Taiwan can have a positive impact on 
regional stability and security. The fact that all this leaves us with an unwieldy 
description for Northeast Asian regionalism as a Three (or Four) plus Three plus 
One helps to explain why it has been so slow in forming. Insuffi cient historical 
reconciliation among the core Three (or Four, if we include North Korea) and 
the preeminent role for the United States in the peripheral Three are other key 
factors. Still, there has been slow progress on a variety of fronts.
As noted above, the Asian fi nancial crisis and the establishment of ASEAN Plus 
Three was a galvanizing moment for Northeast Asian regionalism. The leaders 
of South Korea, China, and Japan met for the fi rst time on the sidelines of the 
ASEAN Plus Three summit in 1999, and they continued that tradition each year 
afterward, stimulating trilateral bureaucratic coordination in a variety of areas at 
levels never seen before. Tangible outcomes were modest, but they did launch 
joint research on economic cooperation and a joint business forum, harmonize 
certain customs and direct investment procedures, expand people-to-people 
exchanges, and implement certain environmental monitoring projects such as 
one focused on yellow dust. Such trilateral summits took on added importance 
and a higher profi le when the three leaders met separately from ASEAN for the 
fi rst time in December 2008 in Japan and unveiled an ambitious action plan for 
promoting trilateral cooperation.8 The second such summit held in Beijing in 
October 2009 came just after a major change in government in Japan, which 
limited opportunities for new initiatives.
Continuing these summits in the future should provide a useful venue for the 
three governments to mobilize resources in pursuit of certain common objec-
tives, to develop a trilateral caucus of sorts within other organizations (such as 
ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit, ARF, or the six-party talks), and to 
defuse tensions if disagreements or confl icts erupt. The trilateralism experience 
of the United States, Japan, and Korea to coordinate policy toward North Korea 
has already demonstrated the value of a three-way meeting to allow for dialogue 
8 The action plan and other joint statements from the fi rst independent trilateral summit are available 
on the Web site of Japan’s Foreign Ministry at www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/index.html. The 
documents address economic and fi nancial cooperation, disaster management, cyber security, envi-
ronmental cooperation, and many other issues.
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in the midst of a dispute, when bilateral discussion is politically  sensitive.9 
Nevertheless, there is a limit to how far they can go on their own. So far, a good 
portion of the “Plus Three” agenda has focused on their interaction with other 
institutions and initiatives. Largely because regionalism among themselves 
has taken so long to develop, most issues such as proliferation, pandemics, or 
trade liberalization are already “owned” by other organizations. Ultimately, 
the utility of ROK-Japan-China trilateralism will depend in large part on how 
the three countries come to defi ne trilateralism’s underlying purpose, on which 
there is no clear consensus as yet (despite recent rhetoric supporting East Asia 
community building).
At their most basic level, regional initiatives of this kind can try to either achieve 
something positive or prevent something negative. The latter is generally easier 
to do as a group, while acting collectively to achieve something requires specifi c 
agreement not only on the common goal but also on the strategy and tactics to 
reach that goal. For this reason, U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation vis-à-vis North 
Korea in the 1990s and the 2000s was more about preventing North Korean 
escalation and a rupture in the alliance relationships than it was about achiev-
ing denuclearization (Schoff 2005, 25). A similar dynamic is evident with other 
issues, whether it is mitigating confl ict regarding territorial disputes, historical 
interpretations, fi shing rights, or energy infrastructure development. Actually 
solving such disputes or implementing bold new measures such as a free trade 
agreement or the Greater Tumen Initiative is more diffi cult, but it can be done 
under the right circumstances.
For the most part, efforts to achieve specifi c objectives are handled more effec-
tively at the bilateral level, while regionalism has a role in minimizing discord 
and taking incremental steps toward broad goals over time. Although the percep-
tion of organizing collective activity either for or against something can often 
be two sides of the same coin, a shared understanding of which side you are on 
is critical for successful regional cooperation. The six-party talks is an extreme 
example of an initiative working at cross-purposes within the membership, which 
helps explain why it has accomplished so little. Nations in the region have had 
an easier time aligning for something in a bilateral manner. If regionalism in 
Northeast Asia is going to be relevant, the countries involved will need to agree 
on what role they think is feasible in the face of various security challenges.
9 Amid an ROK-Japan bilateral dispute regarding history textbooks and Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
visits to Yasukuni Shrine, for example, just about the only chance for dialogue that Korean and 
Japanese diplomats had came in trilateral meetings with the United States. The trilateral venue was 
known at one time as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (Schoff 2005, 23).
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III. Evolving Security Demands Affecting the Region
Although North Korea is not the only security challenge that Northeast Asia 
faces, North Korea is at the center of the region’s security problems. The North 
Korean problem is threefold. First, there is the potential threat to South Korea 
posed by North Korea’s large and forward-deployed armed forces; the govern-
ment’s closed, autocratic, and aggressive nature; and its unwavering commitment 
to national unifi cation on its own terms. This is the primary peninsula security 
conundrum. Second, North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs combined 
with its propensity to proliferate threaten a wider range of states, both inside and 
outside of the region. Finally, North Korea’s decrepit economy and the potential 
for political instability when power shifts to a new generation form in combina-
tion a ticking time bomb that could exacerbate an already appalling human and 
environmental condition in that country. In this sense, North Korea’s tenuous 
viability as a functioning state is a potential threat to the region if it leads to a 
humanitarian catastrophe.
All of these North Korean security dynamics can both affect and benefi t from 
the involvement of other countries in the region, but the stakes and priorities 
vary from nation to nation, and policy coordination is currently weak. Somewhat 
ironic is the fact that North Korea’s provocations and self-imposed isolation have 
been major catalysts for what little collective dialogue and action have emerged 
on the security front in Northeast Asia, be it the four-party talks, Trilateral Co-
ordination and Oversight Group, six-party talks, and fi ve-party consultations 
(that is, six-party talks minus North Korea) regarding the crafting of relevant 
UN Security Council resolutions (Snyder 2009). For the most part, however, 
the three different North Korean security dilemmas mentioned above have not 
been addressed in an integrated or consistent manner. We should also remember 
that none of them can be solved without a fundamental change in approach by 
North Korea. These are all long-standing and long-festering problems that have 
so far resisted regional cooperation, except when it comes to simply managing 
the situation and its potential negative effects. In its current form, North Korea 
might stimulate collective dialogue and some preventive action in the region, 
but it cannot be the issue that truly promotes regionalism and binds neighbors 
together for constructive purposes. The gaps are too large, and the stakes are 
too high.
The small bit of change surrounding these issues stems from North Korean mis-
sile and nuclear improvements and from ROK economic development. DPRK 
missile and nuclear gains have led to stronger U.S. alliance relationships in the 
region than would otherwise be the case, manifested in continued large numbers 
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of forward-deployed U.S. forces, enhanced interoperability, information shar-
ing, cross-servicing agreements, missile defense development, and consistent 
reaffi rmation of the alliances by the top political leadership in the United States, 
South Korea, and Japan. The ROK’s economic development and its growing 
confi dence vis-à-vis the North are responsible for higher levels of North-South 
interaction compared with pre-2000 levels as well as for the planned transfer of 
wartime operational control of ROK forces back to South Korea in 2012. At the 
same time that Washington is trying to strengthen its alliance relationship with 
South Korea to deter the North, it is also seeking to transform the alliance to 
give more responsibility to Seoul and to establish a posture that is more fl exible 
in the near term and more appropriate for a unifi ed Korea in the future.
Another driver of change in the security arena is the previously obscure threat 
posed by “global terrorism,” which became the most important factor in U.S. 
defense planning after the 2001 attacks in the United States and which led to 
long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is another U.S. prompt for alliance 
transformation with Korea and Japan because the battle against terrorist networks 
involves more than defensive military action and includes countering prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian assistance and development 
aid, democracy promotion, and other missions. The rationale for and method 
of restructuring the alliances, therefore, are trying to be applicable to both the 
current strategic environment and a post-DPRK world. The U.S.-ROK Joint 
Vision statement of June 2009, for example, embodies all of these objectives 
and represents a bilateral attempt to adjust to evolving security demands. This 
should be coordinated with other similar initiatives in the region.
When it comes to change in the regional security environment, China’s mili-
tary modernization is perhaps the most important development, particularly its 
investments in area denial capabilities (new submarines, missiles, and aircraft) 
that are narrowing the gap in conventional-weapons superiority long held by 
the United States and its allies. The main source of concern is not simply that 
China is spending more on defense and modernizing its forces (although China’s 
defense budget has more than doubled since 2001).10 Instead, it is the nature of 
this modernization and the relatively quick and substantial investment in certain 
capabilities that are steadily eroding the allies’ ability to dominate the skies and 
seas around East Asia as they once could. When China’s military investments 
will plateau is also unclear.
10 U.S. offi cials (OSD 2009) estimate that China’s actual defense spending was roughly $60 billion 
in 2001, and that it was about $140 billion in 2008.
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For example, China’s ballistic missile program is among the most active in the 
world; its indigenous J-10 fi ghter aircraft represents a generational advance; its 
submarines, torpedoes, antiship cruise missiles, and other weaponry are increas-
ingly sophisticated; and it is apparently preparing to build and deploy aircraft 
carriers (Minemura 2008). In addition, China is modernizing its strategic nuclear 
forces with new JL-2 sea-launched missiles and solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 
missiles, both with ranges of approximately 7,000 kilometers. Beijing is pur-
suing this at the same time the United States is reducing its nuclear stockpile, 
likely resulting in a truly viable Chinese second-strike nuclear capability at some 
point. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in 2009, “we should 
be concerned . . . with [China’s] ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and 
narrow our strategic options” (Capaccio 2009).
All of this suggests that the United States could lose its nearly exclusive domi-
nance over the confl ict escalation ladder in the region, and some in Tokyo (and 
to a lesser extent in Seoul) worry that this will cause Washington to seek to 
avoid escalation at almost any cost. Thus, allies’ questions about the future of 
nuclear balance immediately put the spotlight on the regional conventional bal-
ance, which is still favorable for the alliances but trending undesirably vis-à-vis 
China. This is essentially an East Asian version of the old Western European 
fear of “decoupling” during the Cold War, when some worried that the United 
States might detach itself from its strategic commitment to Europe in the face 
of a strengthening Soviet Union. In addition, China’s large-scale investment in 
U.S. debt instruments and the strong trade ties between the two could add to U.S. 
reluctance to confront China, at least when viewed from Japan (Schoff 2009). 
Beijing, of course, views the traditional U.S. military dominance in the region 
as the anomaly, and it insists that it is making only reasonable military upgrades 
commensurate with its growing wealth and responsibilities. The challenge for 
Northeast Asia is how to avoid an arms race of sorts prompted by perceptions 
of a security dilemma.
Traditionally, the most dominant analytical framework used to assess the future 
of the Northeast Asia region is the balance-of-power theory. Many analysts have 
predicated their discussions on traditional zero-sum terms that tend to underscore 
the competitive drivers in Asia.11 A typical view (Friedberg 2001, 7) holds that 
“Asia’s future will resemble Europe’s past; that it will be marked, in other words, 
by competitive great-power politics, shifting alliances, costly arms races, periodic 
crises, and occasional wars.” This specter looms even larger if U.S. economic 
weakness and indebtedness persist amid a backdrop of a declining U.S. dollar, 
11 For a pessimistic assessment, see Dibb, Hale, and Prince (1999). This parallel was also drawn by 
Bremmer, Choi, and Kawaguchi (2005/06).
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a rising yen, and a rising yuan. America’s “sole superpower” moment could be 
waning, which is not problematic in and of itself unless the region’s adjustment 
leads to friction and confl ict. If we accept that the balance of power is shifting 
in East Asia, then we ought to expect important changes ahead. The value of 
Northeast Asian regionalism, therefore, lies in its ability to help prevent or man-
age potential confl icts that could erupt during this shift.
IV. Economic Ties and Outside-In Regionalism
to Foster Stability
China’s rise in the region is unsettling to some, but, generally speaking, it has 
been a great boon for East Asia, and Northeast Asia in particular. Japan’s economy 
would be in far worse shape, after the bursting of its economic bubble in 1990, 
were it not for growing exports to China from the mid-1990s onward. Japan’s 
share of total exports to China rose from 5.2 percent in 1997 to 13.5 percent in 
2005, and this was during a period of explosive growth in the Chinese economy 
(Weiss 2008, 265). China’s imports rose more than sixfold during this time. South 
Korea’s share of total exports to China rose from 10 percent to nearly 22 percent 
in the same period. These export volumes far exceed those for any other country 
in East Asia, and even the rates of growth are among the highest.12 In the big 
picture, the overall benefi t of China’s growth for South Korea and Japan has so 
far outweighed the downsides of injury to specifi c industries or a marginal decline 
in potential confl ict escalation control. Whether this statement will remain true 
in the future is another story. As noted above, the recent concern is that China’s 
accumulation of market and military power will allow it to dictate terms when 
it comes to regional collective efforts or attempts to resolve disputes.
The nascent regionalism we see in Northeast Asia could be a useful tool for 
mitigating the potential negative effects of changes in the balance of power 
and growing rivalry and competition. After all, even though relational identity 
among the core three (China, Japan, Korea) is relatively weak, it is not neces-
sarily negative, and there are many positive aspects to which we can point. 
This is not an anarchic, self-help sort of regional security system. Overall, it is 
more accurately described (Alagappa 1998, 54–55) as a cooperative system that 
lies somewhere between self-help and a community security system (the latter 
marked by a common regional identity and security interests). As Alagappa 
(1998, who cites Stein 1990) describes, “States may be somewhat suspicious 
and mistrustful of each other [in a cooperative system], but there is no percep-
tion of immediate threat . . . [and they] have a mutual interest in avoiding least 
12 The Philippines scored the highest in terms of growth rate, going from 1 percent of total exports 
to about 10 percent (Weiss 2008).
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preferred outcomes . . . and promoting common interests through collaboration.” 
We see this in the halting emergence of trilateralism among the “Plus Three” 
in trade and investment promotion and in the ability of the six-party talks to 
function somewhat effectively as a consultative group without North Korean 
involvement. The three are linked to the fi ve, just as the fi ve are linked with 
France and Britain during negotiations regarding the crafting of UN Security 
Council actions vis-à-vis North Korea. It could become a series of concentric 
circles with the “Plus Three” group at the core.
The concepts of a linked security system in East Asia and “outside-in” regional-
ism in Northeast Asia are helpful when considering architecture options for the 
future. Some have argued that linking institutions (whether bilateral, multilateral, 
or global) is critical for developing Northeast Asian security regionalism, rather 
than establishing a single multilateral institution.13 Kikuchi Tsutomu (2008, 204) 
makes this argument, emphasizing the wide range of interconnected security 
issues involving different combinations of regional players, and he suggests 
that mutually coordinated or interlinked institutions can create de facto secu-
rity multilateralism in the region. Bilateral U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan efforts 
to counter proliferation, for example, can link to the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the UN Security 
Council. Various bilateral efforts to deal with territorial disputes can link to 
broader regional and global institutions for support. Building a peace regime 
on the Korean peninsula is primarily an inter-Korean responsibility, but it also 
connects to the U.S.-ROK alliance, eventual four-party talks on the topic, the 
six-party talks, and the UN.
The UN system in particular (in combination with certain nongovernmental 
organizations [NGOs]) is often overlooked during discussions about Northeast 
Asian regionalism, despite the UN’s involvement in the Korean War and main-
tenance of the armistice. It can be especially useful when dealing with short-
term crises of a sensitive nature or as a partner in various functional areas. The 
World Food Program (WFP), for example, organized food relief programs in 
1995 and then again in 1997 after a combination of fl oods and drought caused 
famine-like conditions in North Korea. Between 1995 and 2001, the WFP 
contributed two million tons of food aid worth $500 million to the North. The 
principal contributors were the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the EU 
(Lee 2003). The World Health Organization and the UN Development Program 
13 Yamamoto (2008) explains that one of the ways Northeast Asian countries can institutionalize 
their relations is to borrow principles of global institutions or to become part of larger regional orga-
nizations. He calls this “outside-in” regionalism.
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became involved in North Korea around this time, and they have continued to 
run programs there.
Access and monitoring of international aid activities in North Korea have al-
ways been problems, but there has been some improvement over the years, and 
continued progress holding North Korea to international standards in such areas 
will be important if the region attempts to assist the country economically (or 
in times of crisis). In the 1990s, the UN and other relief organizations delivered 
food to starving people throughout the famine, but they were unable to determine 
the scale of the famine because offi cials could not move freely. Relief agen-
cies responding after the Ryongchon train station disaster in 2004 faced similar 
problems at fi rst, but eventually a wider range of contributors (including direct 
bilateral contributions from the ROK) and multiple entry points (for example, 
shipping ROK contributions to China and trucking from Dandong) were al-
lowed. At this time the Food and Agriculture Organization was also involved in 
recovery projects following that disaster, and the UN’s Offi ce of the Coordinator 
for Humanitarian Assistance had its fi rst experience in the North.
There was incremental improvement later, after the devastating fl oods of 2007 
in North Korea. Unlike during the 1995 fl oods, the North Korean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs immediately organized visits for UN, NGO, and other foreign 
offi cials to some of the heavily affected areas. The WFP required additional 
outside help to repair the damaged roads and rail it needed to use to deliver the 
food shipments to the affected rural areas. The Red Cross (which has years of 
experience in the North) entered North Korea, assessed the substantial damage 
to the health infrastructure, and appealed for $5.5 million for basic emergency 
medical aid. Unlike during the 1990s famine, UN offi cials were able to confi rm 
the urgency of the situation and the scale of damage the fl ooding caused.
There is no need to create a new institution to try to coordinate activities of this 
kind or to address most other regional challenges, but there is room to improve 
how existing organizations communicate and coordinate with each other. The 
parties involved can accomplish this in part via the U.S. alliance relationships, 
certain minilateral initiatives, and regional and global forums as long as they 
are careful not to contradict one another in these different venues. Linkages 
among different institutions and initiatives can facilitate communication and 
standardization, which are among the primary benefi ts of regionalism. This leads 
to mutually recognized expectations, minimizes misunderstandings, and helps 
with dispute resolution when necessary. Over time, the nations involved can 
streamline these interconnections, as the relative value of some linkages over 
others will reveal themselves. Outside-in regionalism might not be suffi cient 
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in the long term to address specifi c Northeast Asian challenges, but it is a good 
start. The question is, how do we reconcile these various bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives and establish constructive links between them without wasting effort, 
creating confusion, or potentially undermining useful organizations?
V. The Nexus of Enriched Bilateralism, 
“Plus Three” Trilateralism, and Six-Party Talks
Proposals to create a formal regional security mechanism in Northeast Asia often 
get a skeptical reception in military and government circles, especially in Seoul, 
Tokyo, and Washington, where confi dence in their alliances is high. The lack 
of progress in the six-party talks working group on building a regional security 
mechanism is partially attributable to this lack of enthusiasm. Even if the six-party 
talks were to succeed in DPRK denuclearization, this skepticism would persist, 
because many worry that a regional forum might create an illusion of functioning 
multilateralism, thus weakening the bilateral alliances without a robust enough 
replacement. Some argue that the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 had this effect 
on the Anglo-Japan alliance at the time. As one former high-ranking Japanese 
diplomat put it: “The six-party talks are not particularly effective, but they are 
worth a try, and we can say at least that they are harmless. But the alliances are 
useful. They can accomplish tangible things, both in the region and abroad. We 
must be careful not to replace ‘useful’ with ‘harmless.’”14
The allies should maintain and upgrade their security relationships, and they 
should continue to look for opportunities to develop linkages among them and 
with other partners in the region. This is part of what alliance transformation is 
all about. Some have described this as a shift from exclusive, hub-and-spoke 
bilateralism to so-called extended bilateralism. William Tow (2003) argued that 
the growth of multilateral institutions and the tightening web of interdependence 
have substantially enhanced mutuality of interests among Asian states. In re-
sponse to such trends, and in light of the U.S. focus on capabilities and interests 
rather than threats as the organizing principle for alliance management, Tow 
urged that these ties should be extended to each other or complement multilateral 
institutions as a bridge to accommodate the convergence of interests among the 
various regional players.
In a variation of the same theme, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, former commander 
in chief of the U.S. Pacifi c Command and now director of national intelligence, 
called for a fundamental shift away from the competitive balance of power 
mentality, which has dominated interstate relations in the region, through the 
14 Interview with author, 1 August 2007.
166 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
promotion of shared interests (Blair and Hanley 2001). Similar to Tow, he be-
lieved that the road to future stability runs through America’s bilateral alliances 
with South Korea and Japan in the form of “enriched bilateralism.” According 
to Blair, this new structure “principally involves greater consultation and policy 
coordination with the nations of the region regarding the full range of U.S. 
policies that affect their security interests, going beyond those that affect only 
bilateral arrangements.” Such an arrangement could then become the forum in 
which other regional powers are involved as active participants. In this case, 
Blair is talking about the broader Asia-Pacifi c region, but we can apply these 
principles more narrowly to Northeast Asia as well. He envisioned the inclusive 
process serving as a stepping-stone toward genuine multilateral mechanisms.
Throughout the 2000s, the United States and its allies have essentially been 
moving in this “enriched bilateralism” direction, albeit at a modest pace and 
with varying degrees of political support, depending on the party in power.15 
This has been an underlying theme of the U.S. Theater Security Cooperation 
plan for several years; and it manifests itself in a series of trilateral initiatives 
(for example, U.S.-ROK-Japan, U.S.-Japan-Australia, and U.S.-Japan-India); 
in expanding participation at certain military exercises in Thailand, Mongolia, 
and the Pacifi c Rim; and in broader multilateral initiatives such as PSI or the 
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team. The June 2009 U.S.-ROK alliance 
Joint Vision statement (White House 2009) emphasizes these themes clearly in 
its paragraph on regional security and prosperity. Under Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro and his successors, Japan had been moving in this direction since 
2001 (if not before), but the new Japanese government led by the Democratic 
Party of Japan seems less interested in this approach if it entangles Japan in a 
wider range of security commitments. Even so, politicians can emphasize the 
“enriched” portion of enriched bilateralism by expanding security ties with other 
regional partners (such as a possible new cross-servicing agreement between 
Japan and Australia), while this expanding security network remains rooted in 
the bilateral alliances.
An important consideration is how the concept of enriched bilateralism relates 
to China and how Beijing perceives its development. Clearly, China will be a 
bigger security player in the region as time goes on, but it is hard to imagine a 
Sinocentric security system emerging anytime soon. The U.S. alliance system 
will remain central to the preservation of Northeast Asian stability for some 
time. Depending on whom you ask, however, some see the alliances (and their 
accompanying network) as a way to balance against China, while others see them 
15 For example, President Roh Moo-hyun was relatively uninterested in pursuing this sort of ar-
rangement with the United States, but his successor, Lee Myung-bak, has been supportive.
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as a way to build a regional security framework that fully incorporates China as 
an integral member. The latter view is likely to be more stable and productive 
in the long run, if it is achievable (and this depends, in part, on China’s actions, 
as well).
Thus, the process of strengthening alliances and diversifying them should be 
done in an inclusive way that connects them together with each other and with 
nonalliance partners. This is a strategy to get beyond the traditional balance-
of-power approach and ameliorate the security dilemma, and it can provide 
meaning to the concept of wheels-to-webs (it is not wheels-to-shields, after all). 
The allies are already pursuing this inclusive strategy to some degree in certain 
functional, nontraditional areas of security cooperation, including disaster relief, 
peacekeeping operations, and anti-piracy efforts, but there is still a long list of 
topics currently off the collective agenda that could be added, such as contin-
gency planning for a sudden change in North Korean leadership, information 
sharing, cyber security, and counterproliferation. Early on, some of these issues 
might be dealt with constructively in unoffi cial track-two academic or profes-
sional venues, slowly taking on a more offi cial character as the value of regional 
dialogue becomes more apparent, less politically sensitive, or both.
The concept of enriched bilateralism is not restricted to the security sphere, 
and it was evident at least as early as 2000 in the CMI and its bilateral swap 
arrangements. A graphic depiction of these swap arrangements (Figure 1) 
demonstrates how a regional architecture can be constructed through carefully 
arranged bilateral agreements. Japan, China, and Korea act as the anchor for 
CMI, but another facilitating component is ASEAN’s cohesiveness. Even though 
these are bilateral swap arrangements, the fact that Thailand, Malaysia, Singa-
pore, and other ASEAN nations are part of the same “in” group makes it easier 
to negotiate the deals using common standards. The combination of a strong, 
coordinated anchor and a group of organized counterparts is a big part of what 
makes CMI credible and stable.
For Northeast Asian regionalism, strengthened trilateral coordination among the 
“Plus Three” countries in a variety of functional areas can be an effective and 
manageable anchor (supported by the U.S. alliances and enriched bilateralism). 
These functional areas can include not only nontraditional security cooperation 
as mentioned above, but also cooperation in trade facilitation, space exploration, 
public health, ocean resource management, and other areas.
The network of functional bilateral arrangements will be different depending 
on the issue. On the one hand, disaster relief and public health initiatives might 
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involve a large number of players, including individual countries throughout 
the Asia-Pacifi c region and regional or global forums such as ASEAN, the ARF, 
Figure 1: Network of Bilateral Swap Arrangements under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, June 2009
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tokyo.
* ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) arrangements include all ASEAN members.
and the UN system. On the other hand, the scope of coordinated bilateral agree-
ments for such issues as space exploration, maritime security, or even North 
Korean economic development or contingency planning will be more limited, 
although it will still likely include UN and other international organizations. 
In each case, however, the “Plus Three” countries can play a vital core group 
function, helping to coordinate Northeast Asia’s linkages to other regional and 
global institutions.
The fi nal piece of this puzzle is how to incorporate the “peripheral three” (that 
is, the United States, Russia, and Mongolia), North Korea, and Taiwan in this 
web of linkages, and the six-party-talks experiment offers one solution. The 
United States will already be plugged into the “Plus Three” core through its 
bilateral alliances with Korea and Japan, but those are exclusive relationships. 
Although it is premature for the six-party talks to act as a true regional security 
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mechanism, they can be an effective consulting body for a wider range of issues 
beyond just North Korean denuclearization.16
The six-party talks (with or without North Korea) can begin to address some 
of the functional issues mentioned above, even if it is primarily a form of 
consultation and coordination rather than the point of origin for new regional 
initiatives. This is similar to the concept of a Northeast Asia Regional Forum 
(NERF) presented a few years ago, although the NERF did not include North 
Korea or Mongolia (Bremmer, Choi, and Kawaguchi 2005/06). For certain is-
sues, such as trade, health, and the environment, involving Taiwan should be 
feasible. In this case, the six-party talks could expand to include Mongolia and 
could also involve North Korea if that country is willing to rejoin the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The name of this group might need to change a bit 
to differentiate it from the denuclearization agenda, but it could effectively 
include most of the same participants and meet consecutively (if the six-party 
talks formally resume). Following denuclearization, this group could essentially 
absorb the six-party talks.
The purpose of this group would be to develop regional priorities and facilitate 
outside-in regionalism tailored specifi cally to the needs and unique circumstances 
of Northeast Asia. It would be a more inclusive bridge connecting “Plus Three” 
trilateralism and enriched bilateralism with broader regional forums and interna-
tional organizations, specializing perhaps in energy security and nuclear power 
development, region-specifi c confi dence-building measures, and environmental 
cooperation. It could be a way to spread the benefi cial lessons of certain bilateral 
agreements (for example, joint energy development near disputed territory in the 
East China Sea or other locations) to other forum members, and it could help 
mitigate the potential negative impact of bilateral disputes.
This practical but still progressive approach to Northeast Asian regionalism is 
a way to move from what is not necessary toward what is still too hard to ac-
complish, and it can help to promote regional identity without excluding key 
players outside the region. Our goal should be to try to build capacity over time 
so that we achieve positive outcomes in the long term, even if the near-term 
utility of regionalism is weighted toward the avoidance of undesirable outcomes 
and smoothing over differences. Combining “Plus Three” trilateralism, enriched 
bilateralism, and a six-party-talks-like arrangement can be useful in multiple 
arenas of security, economics, and the environment because it relies more on 
tapping into other successful initiatives and expertise rather than trying to build 
regional solutions in each and every case. The potential benefi t of challenges 
16 For a discussion of six-party-talks capacity building, see Schoff, Perry, and Davis (2008).
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such as the Asian fi nancial crisis and North Korea’s nuclear breakout is that 
they can be catalysts for regional cooperation. We will reap rewards from these 
trials only if we commit ourselves to continually improving our ability to com-
municate and coordinate toward common goals.
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